HIGH CRIME AREA AND AVOIDING THE POLICE DOES NOT JUSTIFY A DETENTION
HIGH CRIME AREA AND AVOIDING THE POLICE DOES NOT JUSTIFY A DETENTION
places. They may consider what they see in plain view and
determine whether what they observe merits further
observation, inquiry, or intervention. They may approach
people in public, engage them in consensual conversation, and
take note of their appearance and behavior. Nervous behavior
and attempts to conceal oneself may provide relevant context.
But before officers may detain someone they must be able to
articulate a legally cognizable reason to infringe on that person’s
liberty.
The Fourth Amendment recognizes a measured
framework for acceptable official intrusion upon the life of any
individual. Police officers and private individuals may well
occupy the same public space and have no particular interaction.
They may also engage in consensual encounters. But before an
officer can compel compliance with a show of authority,
articulable facts must support a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity. In the absence of such facts, the person is
constitutionally protected and empowered to go on his or her
way
COURT HAS POWER TO DISMISS THE GREATER AND IMPOSE A LESSER FIREARM ENHANCEMENT
COURT HAS POWER TO DISMISS THE GREATER AND IMPOSE A LESSER FIREARM ENHANCEMENT
Penal Code section 12022.53 establishes a tiered system of
sentencing enhancements for specified felonies involving the use
of firearms. (All statutory references are to the Penal Code.)
Section 12022.53, subdivision (h) gives trial courts the discretion
to strike those enhancements in the interest of justice pursuant
to section 1385. In People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 700
(Tirado), we held that this discretion includes striking a section
12022.53 enhancement and then imposing a lesser included,
uncharged section 12022.53 enhancement when the facts
supporting the lesser enhancement were alleged and found true
by the jury. We explained that the statutory framework
supported this conclusion. (Tirado, at pp. 692, 700.) We also
noted that this conclusion was in line with the long-standing
principle that “a court is not categorically prohibited from
imposing a lesser included, uncharged enhancement so long as
the prosecution has charged the greater enhancement and the
facts supporting imposition of the lesser enhancement have
been alleged and found true.” (Id. at p. 697.)
The question here is whether the same statutory
framework permits a court, after striking a section 12022.53
enhancement, to impose a lesser included, uncharged
enhancement authorized elsewhere in the Penal Code — that is,
outside of section 12022.53. We hold that it does.
Coming Monday
Coming Monday from the Cal. Supremes
PEOPLE v. McDAVID (WELDON K., JR.)
S275940 (D078919; San Diego County Superior Court – SCN363925)
Argued 2-06-24
This case presents the following issue: Does the trial court have discretion to strike
a firearm enhancement imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.53 and instead
impose a lesser uncharged firearm enhancement pursuant to a different statute (Pen. Code,
§ 12022.5)?
Coming Monday
Coming Monday from the Cal. Supremes:
PEOPLE v. REYNOZA (RAYMOND GREGORY)
S273797 (H047594; Santa Clara County Superior Court – C1775222)
Argued 2-06-24
This case presents the following issue: Does Penal Code section 136.1, subdivision
(b)(2), which prohibits dissuading or attempting to dissuade a victim or witness from
causing a charging document “to be sought and prosecuted, and assisting in the prosecution
thereof,” encompass attempts to dissuade a victim or witness after a charging document has
been filed?
No new criminal cases Thursday
The Cal. Supremes will issue no new criminal cases Thursday.
No new criminal cases Monday
The Cal. Supremes will issue no new criminal cases Monday.
No new cases tomorrow
The Cal. Supremes will issue no new cases tomorrow.
NO NEW CASES TOMORROW
The Cal. Supremes will issue no new cases tomorrow.
DENIAL OF PAROLE ELIGIBILITY TO MINORS SERVING LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE SENTENCES DOES NOT VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION
DENIAL OF PAROLE ELIGIBILITY TO MINORS SERVING LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE SENTENCES DOES NOT VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION
Without foreclosing the possibility of other as-applied
challenges to the statute, we conclude that Hardin has not
demonstrated that Penal Code section 3051’s exclusion of young
adult offenders sentenced to life without parole is
constitutionally invalid under a rational basis standard, either
on its face or as applied to Hardin and other individuals who are
serving life without parole sentences for special circumstance
murder. Under California law, special circumstance murder is
a uniquely serious offense, punishable only by death or life
without possibility of parole. When it was considering whether
to expand the youth offender parole system to include not only
juvenile offenders but also certain young adults, the Legislature
could rationally balance the seriousness of the offender’s crimes
against the capacity of all young adults for growth, and
determine that young adults who have committed certain very
serious crimes should remain ineligible for release from prison.
Hardin has not demonstrated that the Legislature acted
irrationally in declining to grant the possibility of parole to
young adult offenders convicted of special circumstance murder,
even as it has granted youth offender hearings to young adults
convicted of other offenses
Coming Monday
Coming Monday from the Cal. Supremes
PEOPLE v. HARDIN (TONY)
S277487 (B315434; Los Angeles County Superior Court – A893110)
Argued in Los Angeles 12-05-23
This case presents the following issues: (1) Does Penal Code section 3051,
subdivision (h), violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by
excluding young adults sentenced to life without the possibility of parole from youth
offender parole consideration, while young adults sentenced to parole-eligible terms are
entitled to such consideration? (2) Whether the first step of the two-part inquiry used to
evaluate equal protection claims, which asks whether two or more groups are similarly
situated for the purposes of the law challenged, should be eliminated in cases concerning
disparate treatment of classes or groups of persons, such that the only inquiry is whether
the challenged classification is adequately justified under the applicable standard of
scrutiny?
No new cases tomorrow
The Cal. Supremes will issue no new cases tomorrow.
NO NEW CRIMINAL CASES MONDAY
The Cal. Supremes will issue no new criminal cases Monday.
NEW GANG ENHANCEMENT CLARIFIED
New gang enhancement clarified
changes to the requirements for proving the predicate offenses
constituting a “pattern of criminal gang activity” — one of the
requirements for proving the existence of a “criminal street
gang.” (§ 186.22, subds. (e), (f).) As amended by Assembly Bill
333, section 186.22 defines the term “ ‘criminal street gang’ ” to
mean “an ongoing, organized association or group of three or
more persons, . . . whose members collectively engage in, or have
engaged in, a pattern of criminal gang activity.” (§ 186.22, subd.
(f), italics added (section 186.22(f)).) The amended statute
defines the “ ‘pattern of criminal gang activity,’ ” in turn, to
mean, in pertinent part, the commission of (or other specified
forms of involvement in) two offenses enumerated in the statute,
“provided . . . [they] were committed on separate occasions or by
two or more members” of the gang and the offenses provided a
benefit to the gang that is more than reputational. (§ 186.22,
subd. (e)(1), italics added (section 186.22(e)(1)).)
The Courts of Appeal have divided over whether, under
the statute as amended by Assembly Bill 333, the statutory
reference to “collective[]” engagement in a pattern of criminal
gang activity is properly read to mean that each of the two
predicate offenses must be committed in concert with other gang
members and cannot be committed by individual gang members
acting alone. We conclude that this reading is refuted by the
plain language of the statute, which says that the predicate
offenses must be “committed on separate occasions or by two or
more members.” (§ 186.22(e)(1), italics added.) We go on,
however, to consider what the collective engagement
requirement does mean. Reading the statutory text in light of
the Legislature’s purpose of more narrowly targeting the threats
posed by organized group activity, we hold that collective
engagement requires a nexus between the individual predicate
offenses and the gang as an organized, collective enterprise.
This organizational nexus requirement is satisfied by showing a
connection between the predicate offenses and the
organizational structure, primary activities, or common goals
and principles of the gang. Because the Court of Appeal did not
account for this feature of the statute, we reverse and remand
for further proceedings.
No new criminal cases today
The Cal. Supremes issued no new criminal cases today.
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